Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Master's Theses

Graduate College

12-1994

Critical Study of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Jae-Wan Chung

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Chung, Jae-Wan, "Critical Study of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice" (1994). Master's Theses. 5007.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/5007

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

CRITICAL STUDY ON JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE

by
Jae-Wan Chung

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Philosophy

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 1994

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank all those who have helped me during the
course of my graduate studies and thesis work

First, to the members of

my thesis committee, Dr. John Dilworth and Dr. Michael Pritchard, I
extend my sincere appreciation for their guidance and support.
Particularly, I thank Dr. Joseph Ellin for helping me with my thesis from
beginning to end in spite of my poor writing and grammar.
Second, I would l ike to thank my parents, who with all poor
circumstances continuously provided support and encouragement.
Whenever I am in a mental or financial trouble, they gave me their love
and advice. Also, I would like to thank Mi-Hui Kim who checked my
grammar for me several times even though she was also working on her
honors thesis.
Finally, I owe thanks to my wife, Sun-Yee Kim, and my little baby,
Cho-Rom. Sun-Yee's help is so manifold that I cannot enumerate them. I
can only say

II

thank you, Sun-Yee. 11 Due to Cho-Rom I sloughed off my

laziness, and she never tore out my paper.
Jae-Wan Chung

11

CRITICAL STUDY ON JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
Jae-Wan Chung, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1994
In discussing John Rawls' theo1y of justice, my main concern is to
examine his theory, especially in difference principle, and to criticize the
principle.

,.,.-#

The difference principle is that without improving the

conditions of those who are worst off, the advantages of all those better off
should not be permitted. The principle has some problems.
First, the principle is against our common judgment. There is no
reason that we choose the principle under 1 original position, and the
1

11

principle brings about a result to disregard others' important advantages
for the least favored's profits. Secondly, according to Robert Nozick 1 s
entitlement theory, since individuals use and dispose their means
according to their will, the difference principle infringes on individuals'
property right. Third, according to Marxism, the principle does not try
fundamentally to resolve the inequalities, and minimizing inequalities by
permitting inequalities is contradicto1y because the inequalities are due to
the exploitation of the ruling class.
In conclusion, after summarizing Rawls' theory and criticizing
Nozick's and Rawls' theory, I offer Marxism as a proposal to resolve social
inequalities because Marxism is based on our history not on a hypothetical
situation and requires the fundamental solution of inequalities.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Human beings' goal in life is to p11Tsue happiness. Although we do
not cite Aristotle, we sympathize with such aim in life and have
considered how we can achieve that happiness. In a complex society like
ours, when the question of happiness is considered in connection with the
system of society as well as with individual positions, we arrive at a
meaningful conclusion. If any goals that human nature pursues rely on
the systems of society, like politics, economics, and culture, the pursuit of
happiness is also inseparable from the character of the systems of society.
After modern ages, many philosophers have tried to compose the
principle of the system of society based on the general moral theory.
Utilitarianism unfolded their ethical explanation in order to propose
systematic and rational views of morality, whereas the theory of social
contract emphasized the system of society as a device for realizing human
beings' end of life.

Both of those traditional views are concerned with

what the best life is and how the best life is possible.

Happiness as

general conception was connected with conceptions like pleasure, good,
liberty, and equality, or expressed such conceptions.
In considering the most desirable type of society, the conceptions
that come frequently into our mind are liberty and equality because
liberalism, which was result from the enlightenment after modern ages,
1
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has left one of the most effective system of society. In spite of ideals of
liberty and equality, our society faces the problems of political and
economical inequality and injustice.

We began to raise some new

questions. Is our society just? Are liberty, chance, and other social value
distributed justly?

How can we dissolve economical inequality in

distribution? As a result, our society has begun to take justice as a very
important social issue.
John Rawls in A Theory of Justice presents a new social theory
called ''.,justice as fairness" centering around rather justice than the idea of
liberty or equality. In his book, he argues about the principles of justice
and studies on how the processes of the principles of justice can be
justified. To realize just society, he tries to combine liberty and equality.
To confirm such ideas, he proposes two principles of justice: the
principle of equal liberty and the difference principle. How can we come to
the principles of justice? Rawls presupposes an "original position" as a
hypothetical point, and under the original position contracting parties
agree to the principles of justice. Also, to come to the principles of justice,
the parties are excluded from their circumstances. The parties must be
covered by "veil of ignorance".

As the parties covered by the veil of

ignorance decide the basic structure of society under the original position,
they come to the principles of justice.
Also, Rawls says, "what I have attempted to do is to generalize and
to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theOiy of the social contract
as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant." 1 In saying that, he clearly
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of
Harvard UP, 1971) viii.
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explains that his theory of justice reflects contractarian moral and
political ideas, but his argument is not the reappearance of traditional
liberalism.
According to liberalism, since human beings' liberty is inviolable,
nobody can infringe on others' liberties. Liberalists' justice deals with
performing the protection of individual liberties or rights, and the
distribution of goods must be left through individuals' free competition.
Generally, we say that Rawls' theory of justice has a tendency to
egalitarian liberalism.

Rawls explains his theory of justice as an

egalitarian conception of justice by arguing that his difference principle
considers the principle of redress, reciprocity, and fraternity. In addition,
he emphasizes that the first principle is prior to the second one. This is
the principle of the priority of liberty. To establish just society, Rawls
adds egalitarian factors to liberalism. From this we know that his theory
of justice supports welfare capitalism.
Rawls' theory of justice, however, has some problems. First, since
his original position is not an actual situation but a hypothetical one, he
cannot prove the justification of his theory. Second, why must we firstly
consider the welfare of the least advantaged? It is against our common
judgment, and his theory is unhistorical. Third, why must all those better
off use their natural talents or assets only for the least favored? His
theory of justice infringes on personal liberties. Finally, although he tries
to minimize human inequalities by permitting inequalities , his theory
never resolves the problems of inequalities. Although his theory resolves

4
absolute inequalities (poverty), there are still relative inequalities
(poverty) in our society
In this paper, I will discuss Rawls 1 theory of justice and offer
criticisms on his theory. For this work, I will, first of all, consider Rawls 1
theory of justice by using his book A Theory of Justice . Although his book
is divided into three parts, I will focus most- of my attention on the part
titled Theori.
1

Secondly, I will offer some criticisms on his theory of

justice; One critique is on the theory itself, the second is by N ozick 1 s
entitlement theory, and the last is criticism from Ma:rxists 1 position. My
reasons for offering the three criticisms are because we ,first of all, need to
consider the problems concerning his theory itself, and if he takes the
position of egalitarian liberalism, he is criticized by pure liberals because
he will restrict personal liberties for establishing just society, and he is
also criticized by Marxists in point of that he justifies inequalities in
distribution.

Finally, after examining his theory and criticisms, I will

offer conclusion along with a brief summary of this paper.

CHAPTER II
RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
Hypotheses of Rawls' Theory of Justice
The Original Position
The basic subject of Rawls' theory of justice is to form the principles
of justice that judge whether the structure of society distributes social
profits, rights, and duties justly or not. Such principles are justified
because they would be agreed to in an initial situation of equality called
the original position. The starting point of Rawls' theory of justice is the
original position. The 01iginal position corresponds to the state of nature
in the traditional theory of the social contract, but it is not thought of as
an actual hist01ical state of affairs, much less as a p1imitive condition of
culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized
so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. It is to agree to the
principles of justice in order to lay down the principles which decide the
basic structure of a society. Essential features of this situation is that:
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social
status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and
the like. I shall even assmne that the parties do not know
their conceptions of the good or their special psychological
propensities.....This ensures that no one is advantaged or
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
5
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principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 2
By holding onto the original position, contracting parties are
treated on the same footing as moral persons. Since the original position
is the appropriate initial status quo, the fundamental agreements reached
in it are fair. As a result, 1justice as fairness 11 is endowed with proper
1

meaning in his theory of justice.
According to Rawls' view that emphasizes 1justice as fairness",
1

since the principles of justice must be made through a fair procedure, he
attaches importance to fair procedure, and the principles in the procedure
come to be the principles of justice. He tries to apply 1 pure procedural
1

justice" as a model of fairness to the original position. According to the
pure procedural justice, the result is always fair as long as we follow the
procedure. "Pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent
criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure
such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided
that the procedure has been properly followed". 3
The original position is a purely hypothetical situation designed to
induce the concept of justice. Due to the hypothetical situation, we reach
the situation of a contract only in our thought.

By following some

circumstances proposed in the original position, we become contracting
parties and enter the starting point of a hyp othetical situation. Rawls
says,

2 Rawls, 12.
3 Rawls, 86.

Principles of justice should be chosen under certain
conditions. To justify a particular description of the initial
situation one shows that it incorporates these commonly
shared presumptions. One argues from widely accepted but
weak premises to more specific conclusions. Each of the
presumptions should by itself be natural and plausible; some
of them may seem innocuous or even trivial. The aim of the
contract approach is to establish that taken together they
impose significant bounds on acceptable principles of justice.
The ideal outcome would be that these conditions determine
a unique set of principles; but I shall be satisfied if they
suffice to rank the main traditional conceptions of social
justice. 4
In short, the principles of justice themselves are accomplished by some
circumstances.

Accordingly, the representatives who take pru·t in

establishing principles of justice perform their task by following some
conditions.

First of all, contracting parties are ignorant of their own

advantages of natural and social circumstances. The pru·ties ru·e situated
behind the veil of ignorance.

Secondly, the parties ru·e mutually

disinterested and rational individuals. And finally, the principles which
the parties make should con-espond with the formal conditions of justice.
Some Circumstances of Justice
The Veil of Ignorance
The veil of ignorance is a defined system in which the contracting
pru-ties who form principles of justice do not know their own advantages.
They do not know their own fortune in the distribution of natural assets
and abilities, their intelligence and strength, and the likes. Nor do they
know their place in society, its economical or political situation, or the
4 Rawls, 18.

7

8
level of civilization and the information as to which generation they
belong. Nobody knows the conception of the good, their rational plan of
life, their psychology, or the contingencies that set them in opposition. 5
The reason for proposing the veil of ignorance in establishing fair
principles

is to interrupt certain influences coming from personal

advantages of circumstances. If the contracting parties know of their own
particular cases, they try to enter into contract to get advantages which
are suitable to their own conditions.

Coming up with a unanin1ous

contract would, then, be very difficult because of their mutually different
profits. Furthermore, even if they did come up with an agreement, it is
most likely that the agreement would not be fair.

For these reasons,

Rawls tries to cover individuals' particular characteristics through the veil
of ignorance.

As a result, the veil of ignorance is probably the most

important condition in the original position.
As the original position becomes a logical, abstract space and a
general, universal view point by the veil of ignorance, everyone who is
placed in the position comes to the same conclusion. This means that the
veil of ignorance turns contracting parties to anonymous and general
persons.
In spite of the designed system, not everything is covered by the veil
of ignorance. The parties know that they are under the circumstances of
justice.

Also, they understand the political affairs, the principles of

economic theory, the basis of social organization, the laws of human

5 Rawls, 137.

9
psychology, and so on. In short, there are not any limitations on general
information. 6
Rawls' veil of ignorance is a condition for an assumption that after
nullifying individuals' innate and social inequality and returning to initial
equal situation, what fixes the principles of justice is fair. If so, what is
the meaning of the initial situation?

It means that social goods or

personal talents are not distributed. However, how can we nullify hum.an
nature that is distributed with birth? According to Rawls, individuals'
natural goods given with birth - natural inequality - have to be nullified
naturally because we do not have any moral grounds for justifying such
natural distributions.
Mutually Disinterested Rational Individuals
Although Rawls suggests the original position and the veil of
ignorance as logical and hypothetical conditions, they are not whole
presupposition of his theory of justice.

Another part that supports his

theory of justice is the circumstances of justice.

We need to explain why

justice is required and why justice can be a social virtue.
Rawls regards society as a community for the benefit of members.
He points out the fact that the community is a place for the confonnity of
advantages as well as conflicts.

Once again, there is an agreement of

interests in point of having possibility of better life through social
cooperation rather than individual endeavor, whereas there is a conflict
because individuals want to not only nullify the contribution of profit

6 Rawls, 137-138.
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produced by cooperation but also get greater shares for pursuing their
ends than others'.
If so, what are possible conditions to make the system of
cooperation?

Rawls points out that the first condition is 11 moderate

scarcity11 as an objective circumstance. This condition means that ''natural
and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation
become superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures
must inevitably break down11 • 7
The second condition is concerned with the subjects of cooperation
who are mutually disinterested. While the persons have similar desires,
concerns, and interests, so that it is possible for them to cooperate, they
nevertheless have their own ends oflife. Due to these plans oflife or their
sense of value, they not only have different ends and desires but also
conflicting requirement of natural and social resources.

The parties

consider the interests of the self because they are interested in realizing
their plans of life. In short, Rawls' circumstances of justice

1

1

obtain

whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to
the division ofsocial advantages under conditions ofmoderate scarcity. 11 8
In addition to the above contents, Rawls defines more concrete
properties of the parties.

First of all, they will have rationality, and

secondly, they are not under the influence of envy. Thirdly, they must
have mutual disinterest.
Rawls interprets the concept of rationality in narrow economical

7 Rawls, 127.
8 Rawls, 128.

11
11

sense of taking the most effective means to given ends 9 He thinks that
11

•

every contracting party must have such rationality, then the parties can
choose the principles of justice that improve their plans of life.

The

parties consider maximizing primary value regardless of what their
contents of the plan of life are. As a result, they choose the principle that
maximizes the basic value by two facts what. are called the knowledge of
general facts and the preference of prima.1-y value.
Although the pa.1-ties are intercepted from several information by
the veil of ignorance, they try to keep their freedom, to extend their
advantage, and to magnify their means to realize their ends. Accordingly,
A rational person is thought to have a coherent set of
preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these
options according to how well they fu1-ther his purposes; he
follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather
than less, and which has the greater chance of being
successfully executed_ 10
A rational person does not make unreasonable contract that he
cannot keep. Under such a basis, the agreement of contract is possible.
Also, their agreement is not forced to arbitrary principle. For example,
since a principle like

1

1

give a person with curly hair a privilege 11 is

arbitrary, we have neither any reason to keep it, nor the principle
improves general profits.

Therefore, while such a principle is denied,

general or universal principles are chosen.
Secondly, the characteristic that the pa.1·ties do not have envy is
very important because if they have envy, they do not agree to the
difference principle that admits inequality. Since a person who has envy
9 R awls, 14.
10 Rawls, 143.
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is hostile to other persons who have better social or economical positions,
and since he tries to reduce others to lower position, the envy produces
social disadvantage. 11 What chooses the p1inciple of justice in 01iginal
position is reduced to the distribution of social primary value. However, if
parties have envy, social primary value cannot be distiibuted equally.
The person who has envy tries to get more. shares than others , while
others deny this because they are also envious. In such cases, envy only
aggravates their situation. Accordingly, the assumption that the parties
are not moved by envy means that in the choice of p1inciples men should
think of themselves as having their own plan of life which is sufficient for
itself
Thirdly, contracting parties in the original position are supposed as
being

mutually disinterested and try to maximize their own social

primary value. What are mutually disinterested means that they do not
have any interests in others' profits. "The parties do not seek to confer
benefits or to impose injuries on one another; they are not moved by
affection or rancor. 12 Rawls compares the indifference to terms of a
11

game.
They strive for as high an absolute score as possible. They do
not wish a high or a low score for their opponents, nor do
they seek to maximize or minimize the difference between
their successes and those of others. The idea of a game does
not really apply, since the parties are not concerned to win
but to get as many points as possible judged by their own
system of ends. 13

ll Rawls, 143.
12 Rawls ' 144 .
13 Rawls, 144-145.
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Rawls' intention to presuppose mutual disinterest is to form the
conditions of choice called the original position, because if the parties have
an interest in one another's advantages, communicate with one another,
and change their concerns, the choices in the original position will be very
complicated.

Also, if the parties have benevolent incentive, Rawls'

principle of justice cannot work. One who has benevolence will identify
his own satisfaction with others' so that the person, after all, tries to
maximize the total amount of satisfaction of social wants.
However, since the contracting parties in the original position are
concerned with improving their own profits, they do not have any desire to
maximize the total amount of satisfaction. If everyone is interested in the
total amount of satisfaction, the principle of justice will be similar to
classical Utilitarianism. Since Rawls does not want such a result, he
grants the parties a property called mutual disinterest.
Accordingly, the rationality that contracting parties have is defined
for their exact account of profits, and if we have more shares than ones in
originally equal condition by perrnitting unequal distribution, it is rational
for us to choose unequal distribution. Also, the condition that the parties
do not have envy is presupposed for exposing the difference principle
which recognizes inequality, and the mutual disinterest is considered to be
presupposed for simplifying the process leading to the difference principle
in the original position. In short, to extract the difference principle, Rawls
assumes that rational people have no envy and are mutually
disinterested.

14
The Fonual Constraints of the Principle of Justice
When the mutually disinterested rational individuals covered by
the veil of ignorance frame and choose the principles of justice, there are
some formal constraints in making an alternative plan to be the morally
valid principle of justice.

According to Rawls,

11

the propriety of these

conditions is derived from the task of principles of right in adjusting the
claims that persons make on their institutions and one another.1114 By
these conditions, the various fonns of egoism are excluded and the forms
of egoism do not have any moral force.

Also, he asserts that the

justification of these formal conditions is not proved by definition or the
analysis of concepts but by the reasonableness of the theory of which they
are a part.15 These can be summarized into five conditions.
1. Principles should be general.

In formulating principles, they

must not use proper names or rigged definite description. Namely, the
predicates used in their statement should express general properties and
relations.
2. Principles are to be universal in application. They must hold for
everyone in virtue of their being moral persons.
3. The condition is the p1inciple of publicity, which arises naturally
from a contractarian standpoint. The contracting parties will know that
they are choosing p1inciples for a public conception of justice.
4. A conception of right must impose ordering on conflicting claims.

14 Rawls, 131.
15 Rawls, 131.
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This requirement s prings from the role of its principles in adjusting
competing demands.
5. 'Th.e condition is the principle of finality. This principle means
that it should have authority as the highest norm to resolve practical and
ethical problems.16
Among alternative proposals that - satisfy the above formal
constrains, the parties choose the principles of justice which regulate a
society to which they will belong. If some alternative proposals do not
fulfill such formal conditions, the proposals are disqualified for the
principles of justice because regardless of contents having the proposals,
the conditions are formal ones which the principles of justice should fulfill.
Two Principles of Justice
The Reasoning Leading to the Two Principles of Justice
In Rawls' theory of justice,

the parties in the original position

choose the principles of justice through the process of rational decision of a
thought.

Rawls makes it clear that the composition of the original

position is concerned with rational choice. If so, how do the contracting
parties in the original position evaluate the principles of justice ? In the
view of

rational choice, the choice in the original position is under

uncertainty because of the veil of ignorance. Although there are several
rules for choice under uncertainty, Rawls insists that the parties will
choose the principles of justice by a maximin rule among the rules. They
will adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the
16 Rawls, 131-135.

16
worst outcome of the others, and then by the outcome of choice, they will
escape a risk that loses the fundamental freedom and the minimal social
and economical conditions which are necessary conditions in planning
their life_ 17
How is Rawls' insistence that the original position is a situation to
which the maximin rule is applied connected to the concrete process
leading to the principles of justice? Rawls thinks that in deciding the
principle of the distribution of social primary value, the parties, first of all,
consider equality_ 18 Rawls, however, insists that there is no reason that
the rational parties receive such simple equality as ultimate end because
if an inequality can improve everyone's circumstances by comparing with
the simple equality, the rational person must accept the inequality.

11

An

equal division of all primary goods is irrational in view of the possibility of
bettering everyone's circumstances by accepting certain inequalities11 .19
Since such inequalities function as incentives for productive efforts, the
inequalities can be justified by contributing to improving everyone's
profits. The view that inequalities which contlibute to joint profits are not
unjust corresponds with the traditional concept of me1itocracy.
Since the contracting parties in the original position are not
interested in others' advantages,
only

11

their acceptance of these inequalities is

the acceptance of the relation in which men stand in the

circumstances of justice. 1 120 As a result, they accept that the inequalities
1 7 Rawls ' 152-155.
18 Rawls, 150-151.
19 Rawls, 546.
20 Rawls, 151.

are just. In addition, since the parties are not possessors of envy who are
discouraged by the bare knowledge or perception that others were better
situated, they will accept a gradation which permits inequality. 21
The above mentioned assumption is connected to the max:imin rule.
Accepting this rule means that as social inequalities are permissible, the
contracting parties assume that they can be the worst men, and in this
case they will choose an alternative which secures the most fortunate
result. This means that they look at the inequalities from the standpoint
of the least advantaged.

Thus, Rawls comes to a conclusion that

"inequalities are permissible when they maximize, or at least all
contribute to, the long-term expectation of the least fortunate group in
society. 11 22 This conclusion suggests that inequalities are not accepted by
merit or desert, but is to be accepted as long as improving the prospects of
the least advantaged.

Rawls comes to the general conception of justice

through this process of reasoning.
The General Conception of Justice
According to Rawls, the general conception of justice is that "all
social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and
the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored. 11 23

He is, however, not satisfied with the general conception of

justice, so he thinks two principles of justice. In short, he considers the
21 Rawls, 151.
22 Rawls, 151.
23 Rawls, 303.

17
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special conception of justice because the general conception of justice
imposes no restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible and
requires that everyone's position be improved.24 Although Rawls says
that "we need not suppose anything so drastic as consenting to a condition
of slavery, 11 25 it is possible, at least theoretically, for us to suppose that
slavery is accepted as being beneficial to the .least advantaged men. To
prevent such a situation, Rawls pays attention to the problem of priority
between the social primary goods and tries to establish principles that
treat the problem.
Rawls thinks that the principles of justice derived from the
procedure is in accordance with moral judgment that we consider.

His

p1inciples of justice are justified not only by congruence that the p1inciples
accord with our moral judgment 26, but also by a conclusion followed from
the process of demonstration corresponding to deduction from the 01iginal
position that Rawls thinks

as a fair moral view.

His method treats

congruence between the principles of justice, moral judgment, and the
original position so that he pursues reflective equilibrium in wide
meaning.
Two Principles of Justice
Rawls thinks that principles applied to the basic structure of society
must be chosen by persons controlled by the principles through fair
procedure and the agreement of unanimous consent.
24 Rawls, 62.
25 Rawls, 62-63.
26 Rawls, 409.

His position
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obviously shows that his theory of justice is based on a contract theory.
He presupposes

an initial contracting situation and presents some

principles that the contracting parties that participate in the initial
situation will choose. The principles are formulated as the two principles
of justice.
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be
ai.Tanged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be
to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and
offices open to all.27
According to Rawls' interpretation, the first principle is concerned
with

the aspect of social system that defines and secures the equal

liberties of citizenship.

The extensive basic liberties of citizens are

political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought, and so on.2 8

Such freedoms reflect on modern

liberties of citizens based on the thought of the natU1·al law. Since every
citizen has rights to enjoy the freedoms, the basic liberties have to be
equal. Because we can find the idea of equal liberty in the fu·st principle,
we characte1ize the first principle as the principle of equal liberty.
The second principle is the aspect of concretizing social and
economical inequality. According to this principle, "while the distiibution
of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone's
advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and offices of
command must be accessible to all. 11 2 9 After Rawls explains (a) of the
27 Rawls, 60.
28 Rawls, 61.
29 Rawls, 61.
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second principle as the difference principle and (b) of the second as the
principle of fair equality of opportunity,30 he clears and develops the
principles. The principles can be rearranged as follows:
1. The first principle: principle of equal liberty (in extensive basic
liberties)
2. The second principle : (a) the difference principle (in distribution
of social, economical advantages); (b) principle of fair equality of
opportunity (in positions of authority and offices of command in a
community)
However, social and economical inequality must be formed for
everyone's advantage under the principle of fair equality of opportunity,
and the first principle must be prior to the second.
The Principle of the Priority of Liberty
That the first principle must be pnor to the second in Rawls'
explanation means that equal liberty is prior to social and economical
advantages or wealth. The principle is based on a faith that the priority of
liberty is agreed and chosen by the rational consideration of initial
contracting parties in the original position.

This shows that Rawls'

principle of the priority of liberty depends on intuition to some extent.
According to him, "if the persons in the original position assume that their
basic liberties can be effectively exercised, they will not exchange a lesser
liberty for an improvement in their economic well-being. 1131 Such basis
for the priority of liberty is as follows:
30 Rawls, 75-90.
31 Rawls, 542.
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As the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal
significance for our good of further economic and social
advantages diminishes relative to the interests of liberty, ....
Beyond some point it becomes and then remains irrational
from the stand point of the original position to acknowledge a
lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and
amenities of office.32
Why is this so? First of all, 11 as the general level of well-being rises
only the less urgent wants remain to be met by further advances,U33
whereas a growing insistence upon the right for the exercise of the equal
liberties will be more important problem. The second reason is that
human beings have self-respect and the desire to express their nature in
free social union with others. 34
According to Rawls' explanation, self-respect is the most important
prin1ary good. Self-respect is 11 a person's sense of his own value, his secure
conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying
out. 11 3 5 And it means

II

a confidence in one's ability to fulfill one's

intentions.1136
As we feel that our plans of practice are of little value, we cannot
pursue or realize them with pleasure. If so, 11 we cannot continue in our
endeavors, and without self-respect nothing may seem worth doing, or if
some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. 11 37 As a
result, 11 the contracting parties in the original position would wish to avoid
32 Rawls, 542.
33 Rawls, 542.
34 Rawls, 543.
35 Rawls, 440.
36 Rawls, 440.
37 Rawls, 440.

at most any cost the social conditions that undern1ine self-respect. 11 38
From these views, we see that his justice as fairness gives more support
to self-respect than other principles do.
Human beings' self-respect is supported through self-realization
accomplished in relationship between others and social union.

They

distinguish their own ability and excellence in social relationships, receive
recognition from others, and, as a result, they have self-respect.
Accordingly, we must set the free activity of social union forth as a
premise to grow self-respect because what restricts free activity unjustly
is a main cause in hurting self-respect.
The reason why Rawls holds fast to the principle of the priority of
liberty in basic structure of society is because without a premise of free
activity, self-respect is impossible. If we think that economical incomes or
social positions grow self-respect, we may do our best to promote our
incomes and social positions. However, since it is natural that a person's
increase in income or his gaining of a higher position results in others'
decrease in

income and position, there is a discord between the

components of society, and the discord injures their self-respect.
The damage of self-respect does not occur in just society that Rawls
pw·sues because the society is designed so that liberty which supports self
respect precedes income or position. There are, however, still desires for
higher income and higher position in his just society. In spite of the
desires, the society does not expose serious problem like discontent about
the priority of liberty because "the basis for self-esteem in a just society is
38 Rawls, 440.
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not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of
fundamental rights and liberties. 11 39
'Th.e Second Principle
'Th.e Difference Principle. 'Th.e difference principle is that without
firstly improving the conditions of those · who are worst off,

the

advantages of all those better off should not be permitted. As there is no
better way for improving conditions of all those worst off and better off,
this principle requires equal distribution. Inequalities can be permitted in
only when all those worst off get advantages. In applying this principle,
Rawls tries to distinguish between the two cases.
The first case is that in which the expectations of the least
advantaged are indeed maximized (subject, of course, to the
mentioned constraints). No changes in the expectations of
those better off can improve the situation of those worst off.
The best arrangement obtains, what I shall call a perfectly
just scheme.
The second case is that in which the
expectations of all those better off at least contribute to the
welfare of the more unfortunate.
That is, if their
expectations were decreased, the prospects of the least
advantaged would likewise fall. 40
'Ibis principle does not allow the excessive expectations of all those better
off, whereas it tries to maximize the expectations of all those worst off.
The maximin rule is a principle for choice under uncertainty and
ranks alternatives by their worst possible outcomes. In short, "we are to
adopt the alte1native the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst
outcomes of the others. 11 4 1
39 Rawls, 5 .
44
4 0 Rawls, 78.
41 Rawls, 153.

The difference principle that requn:es
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maximizing the advantages of the least favored is logically identified with
the maximin rule that turns the worst case into the best one.
Rawls thinks that under the situation of a particular condition
called the original position, it is rational for us to choose the maximin
rule, and he offers three features of situations that give plausibility to
this unusual rule. First of all, the rule takes no account of the likelihood
of the possible circumstances.

Secondly, the person choosing has a

conception of the good that he is satisfied with the minimum guaranteed
by following the maximin rule.

The last one is that the rejected

alternatives have outcomes that one can hardly accept. 42 Since choosing
the maximin rule is rational in the original position, the original position
is a typical situation equipping such conditions.
The original position, first of all, cannot try to probabilistic
calculations because the veil of ignorance gets rid of knowledge that can
be the foundation of probabilistic calculation.

Secondly, the second

principle of justice guarantees the satisfying minimum. Since other
conceptions of justice like utilitarian conception of justice contain grave
risks like loss of freedom, such conceptions of justice cannot be accepted in
the original position. Under these conditions, everyone will agree with the
difference principle because they have to choose under uncertainty that
they do not know their actual positions.
The justification of the difference principle is accomplished not only
by the strategy of maximin rule but also by appealing to our common
consideration and judgment. Rawls thinks that since natural assets are

42 Rawls, 154.

morally arbitrary, the assets are permitted in only case that they give the
least favored benefits.
This difference principle starts from the principle of redress that
undeserved inequalities require compensation. Rawls thinks that since
the inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these
inequalities must be redressed.

11

The principle holds that in order to treat

all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society
must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those
born into the less favorable social position. 11 43
His intention behind the difference principle is to consider every
possibility for the practical equalization of his principle and trying to fully
utilize the gist that the principle of redress has. For example, he thinks
that in order to improve the long-term expectation of the least favored we
can allocate resources in education.44
equalization.

This contributes to practical

Also, he says that 11 this end is attained by giving more

attention to the better endowed, it is permissible; otherwise not. 11 45 In
this, we can also get a glimpse of his egalitarian view.
In addition, his egalitarian view regards natural talents as
common assets. Thus, those who have been favored by nature can neither
use their gift as more favorable starting place in society nor gain more
advantages merely because they are more gifted. Only on the terms that
improve the situations of those who lost out, all those favored by nature
may gain advantages from their good fortune. The naturally advantaged
4 3 Rawls, 100.
44 Rawls, 101.
45 Rawls, 101.
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cover the costs of training and education that help the less fortunate.46
The favorable conditions and inequalities given by natural and social
contingencies can be corrected through such distributive methods.
According to Rawls, both the distribution of natural talents and
contingencies of social circumstances are neither just nor unjust. They
are simply natural facts. \Vb.at is just and unjust is how institutions treat
these facts. The reason why aristocratic and caste societies are unjust is
bee ause the society adopts the contingencies as a basis for belonging to
specified social classes.

The social system is only a pattern of human

action so that there is no necessity that men should resign themselves to
these contingencies. 4 7

Accordingly, the difference principle not only

undertakes that the contingencies avail only when doing so is for the
common benefit, but also can be a fair way of treating the arbitrariness of
fortune.
Also, the difference principle expresses a principle of mutual benefit
based on a conception of reciprocity. Let us assume that there are two
representatives A and B, and B is the less favored.

If we apply this

situation to the difference principle, since A's advantages have been
obtained in ways that improve B's prospects, B can permit A's being better
off.

In this point, we find that both A and B are satisfied with the

condition of mutual benefit. However, we can think a counter-argument
that due to A's better off conditions regardless of B, A has qualification for
gaining more advantages. On this counter-argument, Rawls says that "no

46 Rawls, 101-102.
47 Rawls, 102.
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one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more
than one deserves one's initial starting place in society. 11 48
Perhaps, someone thinks that the person who has better off
endowments deserves superior character that made their development
possible.

Rawls thinks that since one's character relies largely on

fortunate family and social circumstances, the assertion that he deserves
the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his
abilities is problematic. 49 Accordingly, the representative who is more
advantaged cannot secure the basis for requiring a scheme of cooperation
in which he can gain his advantages without contributing to the welfare of
others.

If so, which case is the most ideal in the more advantaged A 1s
contributions to B? If we draw the contribution curve, a society tries to
avoid the region that A' s marginal contribution are negative and operate
on the upward rising part of the contribution curve. 50 In addition, B who
expects that A's the marginal contribution is rising should permit A's
more advantage.
Although we permit A's advantages under supposing that A's
advantages improve B' situation, there still leaves inequalities. In short,
we cannot get rid of the difference between A's advantages and B's. After
all, Rawls' egalitarian standpoint is a question of adjustment to some
questions like how we reduce the difference between A and B or how we
always improve the less favored upwards. If such a question of control is
4B Rawls, 104.
49 Rawls, 104.
50 Rawls, 104.
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failed, there is little difference between Rawls' the system of democratic
equality and the liberal system structured by the principle of efficiency
and fair equality of opportunity.
The difference principle embodies the idea of fraternity. The idea of
fraternity implies a sense of civic friendship as well as social solidarity.
This idea corresponds naturally with the difference principle that without
the benefit of others who are less well off we do not want to have greater
advantages. At least, to support a system or a policy that we think just,
the system or policy must satisfy the idea of fraternity. Accordingly, two
principles of justice that Rawls' justice as fairness wants to show include
traditional ideals like liberty, equality , and fraternity.

"Liberty

corresponds to the first principle, equality to the idea of equality in the
first principle together with equality of fair opportunity, and fraternity to
the difference principle. 51
11

The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity. The fair equality of
opportunity in Rawls' theory of justice means open positions.

The

important reason for requiring open positions is to get rid of some cases
like that someone who is suitable to a place gets the damage of self-respect
by being ruled out from the place bee ause some places are not open on a
basis fair to everyone. Although those kept out benefited from the greater
efforts of those who were allowed to hold them, they would be right in
feeling unjustly treated because "they were debarred from experiencing

Sl Rawls, 106.

the realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of
social duties. 11 52
The principle of fair equality of opportunity that Rawls emphasizes
does not give formal meaning in law but practical meaning, and then it
performs a role of opening new progress of modern democracy because
liberal democracy is forced to problems called deepening of social and
economical inequality, which raises the questions of political philosophy
like social or distributive justice.

Rawls' this principle keeps logical

resolution in itself against such situations. The practical meaning of this
principle is to fix on a foundation for realizing social or distributive justice.
Liberal equality will also pursue the fair equality of opportunity.
Since this system, however, is closely connected with the principle of
efficiency and permits distribution of wealth or advantages by natural and
social contingency, it does not compose positively conditions realizing the
idea of fair equality of opportunity, 5 3 whereas democratic equality
combined with the difference principle offers conditions coming true the
fair equality of opportunity.

In short, since the system concretizes the

principle in the system of nation or public policy that does not permit
advantages by contingency, it can labor for the fair equality of opportunity
practically.
The First Principle: Principle of Equal Liberty
In Rawls' theory of justice, we characterize the idea of liberty as
equal liberty.

Here, we find that 'equal' defines 'liberty'.

5 2 Rawls, 84.
53 Rawls, 73-74.

Rawls' first
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principle that "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others 11 54 expresses our
common faith that we cannot infringe on others' liberty for our own
liberty, and the expression 'to have an equal right to the basic liberty' is
the basis for the idea of equal liberty.
Accepting the idea of equal liberty as the first principle means that
Rawls' theory of justice is based on modern liberal idea. After amending
this liberal idea, Rawls will embody democratic equality in the liberal
idea. This can be founded in that the first principle is inseparably related
to the second principle. If the first principle does not combine with the
second principle, the principle of equal liberty leaves only a formal
principle. The equal liberty can not be embodied until the first principle
combined with the second. The second principle guarantees the equal
liberty. According to Rawls, equal liberty "is defined by the pattern of
rights and duties, powers and liabilities, established by a practice. ,, 55 The
principle of equal liberty is in harmony with the second principle.
In fact, enjoying liberty is practically possible when we take part in
a social cooperation.

That some practice differentiates in rights and

duties, powers and liabilities, offices and positions and so on is a
indispensable system for running a social community. In the case that we
have a just practice, although the practice has a different system, it
guarantees equal liberty. Accordingly, the conception of difference found
in Rawls' second principle is regarded as an adequate conception that
54 Rawls,

60.
Rawls, "Justice as Fairness", in The Philosophical Review, 67
(1958. 4) 166.
5 5 John
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substantiates the equal liberty. If a system is unequal, the inequality is
not caused by differences in rights or duties in offices or positions but
caused by differences in the benefits or the charges concerned with rights
or duties. 56
Accordingly, Rawls' main concern is on how a system distributes
the benefits or the charges justly. To define the just distribution, Rawls
tries to construct several principles to the system. The idea of equal
liberty is possible when we add more extensive meaning in the ideals,
such as differences of rights and duties and fair opportunity in a
community, and fairness in distribution of benefits coming from the
community under equal rights of fundamental freedoms.

56 Rawls, "Justice as Fairness\ 167.

CHAPTER III
SOME CRITICISMS ON RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
Criticism on Rawls' Theory of Justice Itself
Rawls' theory of justice, which is professedly for democratic
egalitarianism, is an attempt to resolve a long question 'freedom? or
equality?' in political philosophy. In the first principle, Rawls insists on
liberty as the idea of just society and emphasizes the priority of liberty.
Also, to minimize social imbalance caused by the strong stress of liberty,
he permits inequalities in the difference principle, and Rawls thinks that
permitting inequalities is an assumption for realizing the idea of real
egalitru.ianism.
Like long philosophical arguments on social justice, the fair
realization of both liberty and equality holds many theoretical problems,
and Rawls' theory of justice is no exception.

Especially, the pru.·t of

'Theory' in his book needs several critical examinations and needs
theoretical justification in some aspects. Rawls assumes some conditions
to reach suitable p1inciples of justice, and expresses the conditions to the
conception of the 01iginal position. Under the original position he tiies to
construct two principles of justice. Accordingly, we need to examine the
conception of the 01iginal position and the principles critically.
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Criticism on Hypotheses of the Theory of Justice
Rawls assumes that contracting parties do not know their own
social and natural positions and even their sense of value or psychological
inclination, whereas the parties have the knowledge of general facts. The
general facts are the knowledge of understanding political problems or
economical theories and the knowledge of the foundation of organization of
society and rules of human psychology. If so, is it possible for the parties'
knowledge to separate the general knowledge permitted to the parties
from the individual knowledge not permitted to the parties?
'lb.e fact that the individual knowledge excluded by Rawls includes
individual sense of value or the conception of 'good' means that the veil of
ignorance must not only cover their own psychological characteristics but
also cover information about political, economical, and cultural
circumstances of their society. If so, what is the general knowledge? I
think there is no general knowledge not based on individual knowledge or
views.

We have individual knowledge just after we get general

knowledge, and the general knowledge is mostly based on individual
knowledge. Accordingly, Rawls' theory of justice that does not obviously
distinguish the border between general knowledge and individual one is
ambiguous.
To establish the original position, Rawls assumes that while the
information of individual facts is excluded, a general fact that their society
is under circumstances of justice is informed to the parties. As offering
circumstances of justice Rawls tries to resolve the reason why justice must
be questioned in human society. Human community is under a situation
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called 'moderate scarcity' of resources, and the parties must know that
they are under the situation. However, the knowledge that they are under
the situation is impossible without recognizing about several individual
facts. Knowing the social circumstances in order to derive the principles
of justice means that they can judge what is good or desirable and that
they have the will to improve it. The will cannot be revealed without
knowledge intercepted by the veil of ignorance. Because of these points,
Rawls' veil of ignorance encounters theoretically difficult situation.
Also, there is room for the examination of Rawls' views on human
beings that they are mutually disinterested rational individuals who lack
envy.

Can human characteristics have such a mutual meaning?

According to Karl Marx, human nature is defined by the social relation of
classes. The social relation of classes is formed by the conflicts of social,
political, and cultural desires between classes, and the back of conflicts is
acted by the consciousness of social positions, desires and a sense of value
of individuals, and acted by the total of several individual knowledge. If
Marx's views have a persuasive power, Rawls' understanding about
human beings and society is an unhistorical and impracticable prejudice.
As a result, his justification of hypotheses of theory of justice loses its
persuasive power.
In addition, since contract in the original position is a hypothesis,
the contracting parties do not have such knowledge, and the contract by a
hypothetical knowledge is impossible. For example, both A and B are
playing poker game, and when A almost wins the game they find that a
card is short.

Maybe, B can insist that if we make a rule about the

situation that a card is short before playing the game, we may agree with
a rule that the game is invalid. Accordingly, let us nullify this game.
Howeve1·, since B's insistence is not an actual agreement but a
hypothetical agreement, it does not have function as a contract. After all,
the principles of justice derived from a hypothetical contract is not valid.
The powerlessness of a hyp othetical contract is also connected with
the anonymity of the parties that comes from intercepting information
about their conception of "good," plans of life, and psychological
characteristics. The parties covered by veil of ignorance do not have any
information about self-identity, whereas realistic human beings know
their conditions well and try to realize their ends by using their
conditions, such as social positions, wealth and talent. If after sloughing
off the veil of i gnorance, someone regrets agreeing with the contract and
insists that the contract is not binding because "I" in the original position
is not actual myself, the hyp othetical contract loses its effect and meaning.
The veil of ignorance has another problem in deducing the
principles of justice. According to Rawls, the parties, first of all, choose
the first principle of justice that guarantees equal liberty under the
original position because choosing equal liberty is the expression of human
original self-respect.

However, in the case that equal liberties are

conflicted one another, Rawls' theory cannot mediate between the troubles
because in spite of requiring judgment about relative value between two
freedoms or about a standard to resolve the problem, the parties cannot
evaluate the values because of the veil of ignorance.
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After all, although the veil of ignorance is presupposed for deriving
the principles of justice under fair conditions that exclude interests of the
parties, Rawls' view cannot fonn the actual principles of justice due to the
veil. The principles to which the parties covered by veil of ignorance agree
are only formal and hollow agreement.
Criticism on the Principles of Justice
To find principles of justice, Rawls suggests the maximin rule.
After offering three conditions, he shows that choosing principle of justice
in the original position fits in the conditions. 5 7

The maximin rule,

however, brings about paradoxical results. For instance, there is only one
epidemic encephalitis vaccine for one person, and there are two patients
seized with epidemic encephalitis. One patient will be completely cured
and will live for a long time if he uses the vaccine, whereas since another
patient has lung cancer as well as the encephalitis, even if he takes the
vaccine, he can only live for several months.
According to the maximin rule, we have to give the lung cancer
patient the vaccine because his situation is worse than the other. This
prescription is against our common judgment. In other words, since the
rule gives an absolute priority to consideration about advantages of the
least favored, the maximin rule brings about a result to disregard others'
important and large advantages for the least favored's little advantages.
Since such a result is not common or natural, the rule cannot be a general
way in choosing the principles of justice.
57 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 154-156.
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The first condition of the maximin rnle that takes no account of the
likelihood of the possible circumstances, also, has some problems. Rawls
chooses the maximin rule that excludes probabilistic calculation, which is
an insufficient basis for the rule to decide some judgment under uncertain
original position.

If the veil of ignorance is suggested to intercept the

probabilistic calculation about several individual circumstances, the veil of
i gnorance loses its meaning because the offered maximin rule to escape
from the worst possible outcomes is based on a particular probabilistic
calculation that gives much weight to the worst situation.

Since the

contracting parties must judge which cases produce the worst outcomes,
they cannot choose but use the probabilistic calculation about several
alternatives. Rawls' index to the choice of principles loses its suitability.
As we think in connection with the original situation, the second
condition of the maximin rule that guarantees minimum as much as the
two principles are satisfied misses consistency. Since the parties in the
original position are placed in a situation not to know their own
conception of good by the veil of i gnorance, there is no way to confirm
whether they are satisfied with the minimum guaranteed by two
principles or not. As Rawls argues satisfying minimum, he seems to think
actual men not parties in the original position. This deviates from the
composition of his argument on comparison with a mutual view of the
parties in the original position.
His consideration and judgment of distribution of human beings'
natural assets offered to justify the difference principle can be criticized.
The least advantaged readily

consent to the difference principle.
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However, why must the better endowed willingly respond to the system of
society based on the difference principle? And what are the grounds of the
agreement?
Rawls1 two principles of justice basically require equality in
assigning individuals 1 basic rights and duties and express that if the less
fortunated get advantages, social or economical inequalities can be
accepted. Such inequalities exclude justifying persons1 labor that strive
for more advantages.

Then, although what suffers a loss for others 1

advantages can be convenience, it cannot be justice.
According to Robert Nozick , natural common assets given to us
must be used for our survival.

To sustain the right to live, we must

occupy some means from common assets, and labor makes the occupation
possible.

By investing our labor in common assets, we have rights to

occupy them and have private ownership as much as invested amounts.
This theory expresses a principle which maximizes individuals 1 freedom
and which guarantees private ownership.

The principle implies that

distribution is not decided by some system but decided by the process of
free exchange.
Nozick 1 s Criticism on Rawls 1 Theory of Justice
Comparison Between Rawls 1 and Nozick 1 s Theory of Justice
Main difference between Rawls' and Nozick 1 s views of justice is
defined by whether they place the focus on equality or liberty. Rawls
thinks of a state as a cooperation. Persons who want to produce goods
more effectively for realizing their own plan of life gather together,
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produce in cooperation, and deliberate on distribution by designated
standards. Rawls' first concern is the basic structure of society that offers
the above system, and his subject of justice is to distribute goods produced
by cooperation and to distribute the cost expended in producing the goods.
The principles of justice in his theory are the stand of such distributions.
On the other hand, Nozick takes a non interfering stand that leaves
the distribution of goods in markets of open competition, and his subject of
justice is to control the processes of acquisition and transfer to protect
individuals' rights.

His theory of justice deals with carrying out the

protection of individual liberties and rights. Therefore, Nozick's just
society guarantees personal liberties and rights, and the components of
the society realize their sense of value to the full under such guarantees.
Both Rawls' and Nozick's views of justice are to compose the theory
of justice in two main parts called liberty and equality as the resolutions
of conflicts between society and individuals. Nozick's view that does not
disturb personal liberties and rights is in a good contrast to Rawls'
difference principle that accepts some inequalities for the least
advantaged.
Let us concretely examine theoretical differences between Rawls'
and Nozick's views of justice. First of all, Rawls thinks of society as a
cooperation, whereas Nozick regards it as voluntary system of exchange
and considers the social cooperation as a by-product of the system of
exchange.
Secondly, 1n questions of justice Rawls considers the fair
distribution of produced wealth, while Nozick tries to resolve the fair

distribution under a stand-point called the protection of personal liberties
and rights because the protection of personal liberties and rights becomes
the foundation of the behavior of exchange.
'Ibirdly, Rawls considers the subject of justice as the basic structure
of society that makes fair distribution possible, whereas Nozick thinks of
it as individuals1 concrete economical behavior like acquisition or transfer,
and regards the distribution by the system of society as by-subject of
justice.

Here, the basic structure of society that Rawls asserts is like

several forms of system of nation, the constitution, and so on.

Rawls'

intention is to propose the fundamental principles of justice, which make
the primary system of society just,

and to offer the grounds of the

argument.
Fourthly, Rawls asserts the realization of equality as the ideal of
social justice, but Nozick insists on the protection of personal liberties and
rights.

To fairly distribute wealth produced by the cooperation of the

components of society, Rawls pursues desirable equality even though he
permits some inequalities.

Nozick asserts the protection of personal

rights and liberties which is the basis of the behavior of exchange as the
idea of social justice with regarding the distributive justice as a secondary
consideration.
Finally, to improve social welfare as much as Rawls wants, we must
continuously extend the authority and function of nation. If so, Rawls1 two
principles of justice require a wide nation that treats numerous
requirements coming from the principles of justice, and the nation cannot
1
help accompanying with inclination to limit personal liberties. Nozick s
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view to nation is the minimal state.

The state guarantees utmost

individuals' rights and liberties. The distribution of economical goods
leaves in the free competition market. The state merely watches whether
the liberties and rights of participants in the market are infringed or not,
and plays an passive role to prohibit the act destroying the market.
After all, Nozick's social justice is to guarantee individuals' rights
and liberties without infringing on others.

Nozick's theory of justice

focuses on the esteems of liberties and rights rather than equality, and he
is interested in personal possessions or means to resolve the questions of
justice.

If so, what are questions in Nozick's justice? And what are

contents of the principles?
Playing a major role in Nozick's theory of justice is the entitlement
theory that individuals use and dispose their means according to their
will. The subject of the entitlement theory is composed of three main
topics. The first is "the original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation
of unheld thing." 58 This includes issues on how unheld things come to be
held, the process of coming to be held and the things that come to be held
by the process, and the extent of what comes to be held by a particular
process. 5 9

Nozick calls the principle of original acquisition as the

principle of justice in acquisition.
The second topic concerns the transfer of holdings. Through which
processes does a person transfer his holdings to another? And how may he
get a holding from another? This is the principle of justice in transfer.
58 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1974) 150.
59 Nozick, 150.
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The third is the rectification of violation in holdings. What can we
do to rectify injustices? In the case that past injustice has formed present
holdings, what obligations do the performers of injustice have? How are
things changed if beneficiaries and those made worse off are not direct
parties in the action of injustice but their offsprings? This is the principle
of rectification of violations of the first two principles.
According to Nozick, if the world were wholly just, the following
inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in
holdings.
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle
of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holdings.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle
of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled
to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications
of 1 and 2.60
In summaiy, "a distribution is just if it ai·ises from another just
distribution by legitimate means. 61
11

Nozick 1 s theory of justice emphasizes the process.

He does not

question what just systems ai·e, but by what processes being acquired is
just. In explaining the principles of justice, he classifies some types and
tries to show that his theory is different from Rawls' the01y.
1. Current time-slice principles : The justice of a distribution is
determined by how things ai·e distributed as judged by some structural
6 0 Nozick, 151.
6 1 Nozick, 151.
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principles. 6 2

In deciding justice, this principle makes the matrix

presenting distribution to the data of judgment, and it does not need
complex explanation like historical processes or theories.
Fox example, suppose that there are two situations A, B and two
cases I, II about distribution. The first case in distribution (I) is that A
has five and B has ten, and the second (II) is that A has six and B has
nine. The total amount of distribution in I is fifteen (5+10), and the total
amount in II is also fifteen (6+9). Each total amount in I and II is the
same. However, from the difference of amount distributed in B and A, we
know five difference (10-5=5) in I and three difference (9-6=3) in II.
Although each total amount in I and II is the same, the distribution in II
is more equal than in I. As a result, utilitarian chooses case II, and the
distribution in II becomes ClllTent time-slice principle. By choosing which
cases , the principle ofjustice is determined.
2. Historical principle: The Clll--rent-slice principles do not ask why
someone gets less shares in distribution, but only choose better systems
in distribution. In this point, Nozick leaves the current-slice principles in
unhistorical principles in distributive justice. The historical principles of
distributive justice hold that people have rights and qualifications
occupying appropriate distribution according to their past circumstances
or actions. Nozick illustrates a traditional socialists view as the historical
principle. According to the socialist's view, workers are entitled to the
product and full fruits of thei:r labor, and not giving workers what they are
entitled to, the distribution is unjust. 63
62 Nozick, 153.
63 Nozick, 154.
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3. Patterned principles : Nozick divides these principles into
patterned historical principles and patterned unhistorical principles. He
thinks that most principles presenting distributive justice are patterned.
For example, in the principle of distribution according to moral merit, "no
person should have a greater share than anyone whose moral merit is
greater. 11 64 Only when we meastu·e moral nierit (a historical principle)
and materialize the result structurally (a pattered principle), the
distribution of shares is possible. Therefore, the principle of distribution
in accordance with moral merit is a patterned historical principle.
Also, a principle of distribution according to I.Q. measures each I.Q.
and is labeled by I.Q. scores.

This is a patterned principle.

This

distiibution is different from the distribution according to moral merit
because it only requires the distiibution according to I. Q. given naturally
and does not consider the merits.

Accordingly, the principle of

distribution according to I.Q. is a pattered unhisto1ical p1inciple. Besides,
most utilitarian principles, egalitarian principles, and socialists' views
belong to patterned principles.

"To think that the task of a theory of

distributive justice is to fill in the blank in "To each according to his
____11

is to be predisposed to search for a pattern. 11 65

4 . Unpatterned principles : This principle is opposed to the
patterning of p1inciples. Because the patterning of principles infringes on
personal rights whether it is equal distiibution or not. Nozick's principle
of entitlement is historical, but it is different from other historical
principles because while other historical p1inciples are patterned, Nozick's
64 Nozick, 156.
65 Nozick, 159-160.
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1s not patterned_6 6

His historical principle does not define the

distribution according to historical achievements or merits but is achieved
through the processes of acquisition and transfer of holdings itself.

In

short, Nozick's principle of distributive justice is an unpattemed historical
principle.
Nozick's Criticism on Rawls' Theory of Justice
Patterned principles premise redistributive activities and go
necessarily with them.

Regardless of what kind of redistribution except

the redistribution according to the principle of the rectification of
injustices,

the patterned principles of distributive justice infringe on

personal rights. 67 For example, in the case of taxation of earning from
labor, taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the
person, and it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another's
purpose.

Then, we object to forced labor.

Here, we find a self

contradiction that we object to forced labor and, at the same time, do not
object to the tax system taking n hours. 68
Another example, suppose that there are two persons. One chooses
to work longer to make more money, and the other chooses not to work
extra time to enjoy leisure activities.

In such case, if it would be

illegitin1ate for us to seize some of a man's leisure tin1e and to be forced to
work for others during his leisure time, it is also illegitimate for a tax

66 Nozick,
67 Nozick,
68 Nozick,

155, 157.
168 .
169.

system to seize some goods of a man who works the extra time for
others.69
From the above examples, "seizing the results of someone's labor is
equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on various
activities. 11 70

After all, most patterned principles "institute partial

ownership by others of people and their actions ·and labor. 11 71 Accordingly,
since the principles institute right which can own others' body or their
labor as wealth, the principles are apt to violate moral side constraints. 72
In Nozick's view that maximizes individuals' rights and liberties,
the problems in the patterned principles are very serious. Nozick rejects
all patterned principles and proposes unpatterned principles optionally
acquired in individuals' free exchanges process. His principle of justice
based on the entitlement theory is founded on Lockean proviso. According
to Locke,
The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the
support and comfort of their being. And though all the fruits
it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind
in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of
nature; and nobody has originally a private domination
exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them as they are
thus in their natural state; yet being given for the use of
men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them
some way or other before they can be of any use or at all
beneficial to any particular man. . . . . He hath mixed his
labom· with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from
the common state natm·e placed it in, it hath by this labour

69 Nozick,
7o Nozick,
71 Nozick,
72 Nozick,

170.
172.
172.
172.
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something annexed to it that excludes the common right of
other men. 73
In short, as investing his labor in the common state of nature, men have
right to appropriate the inputted things as much as he inputs.
Locke recognizes private ownership by labor with insisting that
nobody has the rights about things owned by labor. With recognizing the
private property, he also elucidates the limitation of ownership, that is,
11at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.1174
Nozick names the limitation as Lockean proviso, which means to
ensure that the situation of others is not worsened. 7 5

From Nozick 1 s

stress, we can guess his hidden meaning that his entitlement theory does
not violate Lockean proviso and, at the same time, is possible.
How is Nozick 1 s entitlement theory possible? If something among
natural common assets has its limitation, how can the persons who have
different personal and social abilities own it without violating Lockean
proviso?

Nozick distinguishes the case that private ownership is

impossible from the case possible. In the forn1er case, by illustrating the
only water hole in the desert, Nozick makes it clearly that nobody can own
privately the water hole. The behavior that owns privately and sells after
discretionally marking the price on the hole violates Lockean proviso. 76
Is it possible to own objects privately in certain cases without
violating Lockean proviso? For example, a medical researcher synthesizes

73 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. J.W. Gough
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966) 15.
74 Locke, 15.
75 Nozick, 1 75.
76 Nozick, 180.

a new substance that effectively treats a certain disease with chemicals
that we use easily available.

The researcher sells the new substance

according to his wanting price. In this case, it does not violate Lockean
proviso because others can easily possess the same materials he
appropriated, and the researcher's appropriation or purchase of chemicals
does not make those chemicals scarce. 77
Another example, someone finds a new substance in a solitary
place. This case also does not worsen others' situation because if he did
not discover the substance no one else would have, and the others would
remain without it. 78 Since an inventor's patent does not aggregate others'
situation it also does not violate Lockean proviso. However, we can expect
the possibility of damage coming from excluding the chances of actual
independent invention by applying for the patent.

To prevent the

possibility of damage, we can suggest placing a time limit on patents. 79
Through the above explanation, Nozick would show that the
unrestricted operation of a market system based on the entitlement theory
does not conflict with Lockean proviso. Let us summarize Nozick's theo1y.
First of all, his principle of justice is to maximize personal liberties.
Secondly, men can acquire freely wealth in Lockean proviso. In addition,
distribution is not decided by a system or matrix but is acquired optionally
through the free processes of exchange.

From these views, we define

Nozick's theory of justice as a liberal theory ofjustice.

77 Nozick, 181.
78 Nozick, 181.
79 Nozick, 181.
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As previously stated we characterize Rawls' theory of justice as
egalitarian justice.

Especially, his difference principle expresses his

egalitarian principle in distribution. Although he insists on tlie principle
of the priority of liberty, the principle cannot be explained without equal
distribution. In short, Rawls' liberty is defined by equality. Now, let us
examine Rawls' egalitarian position through Nozick's criticism.
The Problems of Social Cooperation and Distribution
The subject of Rawls' distributive justice is on how we distribute
interests coming from social cooperation. Nozick adopts the very point as
the starting point of criticism.
Let us imagine n individuals who do not cooperate together and
who each live solely by their own efforts. Each person i receives a payoff,
return, income, and so forth, Si ; the sum total of what each individual
gets acting separately is

Let us assumes that we can gam a larger sum total T by cooperating
together. Rawls' concern is not S but T. Nozick understands T in the
following two ways and criticizes Rawls' theory.
1. How is the total T to be allocated?
2. How is the benefits of social cooperation T-8 to be allocated?

80 Nozick, 184.
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(This formulation assumes that each individual i receives from the
subtotal S of T, his share Si)81
According to Nozick's interpretation, in (1) a distribution of T may
give a particular individual i less than his share Si (The constraint 'H

2':

Si), while in (2) a distribution of T�S may not yield a distribution of T.82
According to Nozick's criticism, Rawls concerns the first one, that
is, how the total sum T is to be distributed. To assist this formulation,
Rawls insists that due to the enormous benefits of social cooperation, the
non cooperative shares Si can be ignored because the Si are so small in
comparison to cooperative one Ti. However, we have to note that people
entering into cooperation would not agree to conceive of such a
formulation of distribution one another.
Why is distributive justice questioned only in social cooperation? If
there is no social cooperation at all, is there no problem of justice and no
need for a theory of justice? What is it about social cooperation that
brings about issues of justice? If it is a conflict of gains, how can we say
that there are no conflict between individuals who produce independently
and fend for themselves? As if there were several Robinson Crusoes, each
working alone on separate islands, who discovered each other, if it were
possible to transfer goods from one island to the next, could they not make
claims on each other? Also, if one of them lives in a naturally poorest
island, and he is starving, is it unfair to claim that justice demands that
he should be given some more by others?83
81 Nozick, 184.
82 Nozick, 184.
8 3 Nozick, 185.

From Nozick's above descriptions that aim at Rawls' theory,
1. The problem of distributive justice occurs in non cooperative
situation as well as in cooperation.
2. 'Ihe system of distribution which disregards individual abilities
to earn their objects without participating in cooperation is unfair.
3. 'Ihe system of how the total T is to be allocated, after all,
infringes on personal ownership.
4. Therefore, Rawls' distributive justice cannot be received.
On the other hand, thinking of the criticisms in Rawls position, we
can explain it as follows;
1. All problems of distributive justice are not to bring about only in
cooperation. 'Ibey can happen to anywhere there are conflicts of interests.
Rawls chooses only the cooperation as a typical case to occur conflicts of
interests.
2. Since the consideration of personal abilities in gaining objects
without taking part in cooperation was already to be approved with a
contract in the original position, there is no reason to make it in question.
3. To be completed by a spontaneous contract, the system does not
infringe on personal ownership.
4. Nozick does not get out of a system of distribution of liberal
market economy.
The Problems of the Difference Principle
Rawls believes that people in the original position, at least, choose
the following two principles.
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1. They requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and
duties.
2. Social and economical inequalities are just only if they result in
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least
advantaged members of society. 84
'The former requires equality in rights· and duties, and the latter
offers conditions to permit inequalities of wealth and authority.

'The

principle (2) as the basic idea of Rawls' difference principle excludes
justifying labors of a small number of people for larger good of whole
members. If some people who have more advantages improve
circumstances of all those worse off , it is not unjust to approve their
advantages.
On the Rawls' egalitarian difference principle, Nozick will question
why individuals in the original position would choose a principle that
focuses on groups, rather than individuals.85 Nozick is displeased with
Rawls' theory that excludes the question of justice in holding achieved
from individuals' free exchange activities. However, since Nozick does not
concern the problem of justice in systems like cooperation, Rawls is also
displeased with Nozick's theory. Rawls' argument on justice in systems is
due to his faith that the realization of distributive justice is carried out
rather through systems than any other ways.
Rawls' difference p1inciple is applied not only to participants in a
cooperation but to the whole important system of society. In point of that
human beings, in some meaning, cannot live without others' help or
84 Rawls, A 'Theory of Justice, 14-15.
85 Nozick, 190.
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cooperation, the difference principle may be interpreted to the principle
which is applied to every groups to permit distribution as well as
cooperation by spontaneous agreement.
According to Nozick, the difference principle, no doubt, presents
terms on the basis of which those less advantaged would be willing to
cooperate.86 We know that there is inequality in the difference principle
because according to the principle, the less endowed are profitable, but the
better endowed are disadvantageous. Seeing in Nozick's position, the
difference principle justifies inequality and infringes on personal rights
by a system.
The Problems of Natural Assets
According to Rawls, natural assets are "arbitrary from a moral
point of view. 11 8 7 Rawls does not recognize natural assets given by the
accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social
circumstance as the holdings which each of them naturally has.
Nozick would ask why holdings should not partially depend on
natural assets, and refutes Rawls' position through the following some
arguments. He proposes the following possible arguments through the
positive argument to establish that the distributive effects of natural
differences ought to be nullified and the negative argument that the
distributive effects of natural differences ought not to be nullified.

86 Nozick, 192.
87 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 15, 74-75.

The Positive Argument. Argument A:
1. Any person should morally deserve the holdings he has; it should
not be that persons have holdings they do not deserve.
2. People do not morally deserve their natural assets.
3. If a person's X partially determines his Y, and his X 1s
undeserved then so is his Y.
4. People's holdings should not be partially determined by their
natural assets. 88
In argument A, Rawls could not accept the first premise because
Rawls rejects the distribution according to moral desert. Rawls says,
"There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth,
and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to
moral desert..... Now justice as fairness rejects this conception. 11 89 Ifwe
summarize the above, it is that the holdings should not be distributed
according to moral desert. Then, this summary is contradictory to the
first premise of argument A that the holdings he has should be morally
deserved, which means 'should be distributed according to moral desert'.
Accordingly, argument A cannot support Rawls' position, and by this
Rawls' assertion that 'should not be distributed by natural assets' (which
means premise 2) loses its persuasive power.
Argument B:
1. Holdings ought to be distributed according to some pattern that
1s not arbitrary from a moral point ofview.

88 Nozick, 216-217.
89 Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, 310.
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2. That persons have different natural assets is arbitrary from a
moral point of view.
Therefore,
3. Holdings ought not to be distributed according to natural
assets.90
Then, "differences in natural assets might be correlated with other
differences that are not arbitrary from a moral point of view and that are
clearly of some possible moral relevance to distributional questions. 119 1
For instance, Hayek argued that under capitalism distii.bution generally
is according to perceived service to others, and this principle is not
distribution in accordance with natural assets. 9 2 However, under a
system whose principle is distributed according to perceived service to
others, differences in natural assets will lead to differences in holdings
because the differences in natural assets give rise to the differences in
capacity serving to others. Therefore, argument B cannot support Rawls'
insistence.
Argument C:
1. Holdings ought to be distii.buted according to some pattern that
is not arbitrary from a moral point of view.
2. That persons have different natural assets is arbitrary from a
moral point of view.
3. If part of the explanation of why a pattern contains differences in
holdings is that other differences in persons give rise to these differences
90 Nozick, 21 7.
91 Nozick, 218.
92 Nozick, 218.
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in holdings, and if these other differences are arbitrary from a moral
point of view, then the pattern also is arbitrary from a moral point of
view.
Therefore,
4. Differences in natural assets should not give rise to differences in
holdings among persons. 93
Through premise 3, we know that

11

any pattern will have some

morally arbitrary facts as part of the explanation of how it arises. 11 94 As
far as Rawls' principle of justice is a patterned principle, it cannot evade
distribution by moral arbitrariness.
According to Nozick,
The difference principle operates to give some persons larger
distributive shares than others; which persons receive these
larger shares will depend, at least partially, on differences
between these persons and others, differences that are
arbitrary from a moral point of view, for some persons with
special natural assets will be offered larger shares as an
incentive to use these assets in certain ways. 95
Nozick's this view attributes distribution as an incentive of the
difference principle - the naturally advantaged can gain interests about
their natural advantages only for using their endowments in ways that
help the less fortunate as well96 - to distribution by moral arbitrariness.
According to Rawls, however, the principle regards natural assets of the
naturally advantaged as common assets and distributes the common
assets to the less fortunated.

After all, this distribution means that

93 Nozick, 218.
94 Nozick, 218.
95 Nozick, 219.
96 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 101-102.

though the naturally advantaged may enjoy the given happiness, they
must return some things of their own to improve circumstances of the less
favored. How can we justify such requil:ements? Rawls would say that
natural assets are morally arbitrary, but his explanation cannot be
sufficient conditions for his argument.
Argument D:
1. Holdings ought to be equal, unless there is a (weighty) moral
reason why they ought to be unequal.
2. People do not deserve the ways in which they differ from other
persons in natural asset; there is no moral reason why people ought to
differ in natural assets.
3. If there is no moral reason why people differ in certain traits,
then their actually differing in these traits does not provide, and cannot
give rise to, a moral reason why they should differ in other traits (for
example, in holdings).
Therefore,
4. People's differing in natural assets is not a reason why holdings
ought to be unequal.
5. People's holdings ought to be equal unless there is some other
moral reason (such as, for example, raising the position of those worst off)
why their holdings ought to be unequal. 97
On the premise 1, Nozick asks that why people's holdings should be
equal in the absence of special moral reason to deviate from equality, why
there should be any particular pattern in holdings, and why deviation

97 Nozick, 222.
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from equality may be caused only by moral forces. 98

Subsequently,

Nozick would emphasize that many "arguments" for equality merely
assert that differences between persons are arbitrary and must be
justified, and ask once again that why differences between persons must
be justified and why we must change, or remedy or compensate for any
inequality which can be changed, remedied, or compensated for. Perhaps,
to answer to the questions, Rawls uses the conception of social
cooperation. Nozick, however, thinks that not all persons who cooperate
together explicitly agree to equality among all persons cooperating
together as one of the terms of their mutual cooperation because in the
case of entering into such social cooperation, although the cooperation can
be beneficial to those less well off, it may worsen the position of the well
off group. 99
According to Nozick, since the argument that unless there is moral
reason, holdings ought to be equal assumes equality as a norm, the
argument cannot be used to establish any such conclusion about
equality.100
The Negative Argument. Argument E:
1. People deserve their natural assets.
2. If people deserve X, they deserve any Y that flows from X.
3. People's holdings flow from their natural assets.
Therefore,

98 Nozick, 222-223.
99 Nozick, 223.
100 Nozick, 224.
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4. People deserve their holdings.
5. If people deserve something, then they ought to have it (and this
overrides any presumption of equality there may be about that thing)_ 101
Argument E is a counter argument about Rawls' view.

Not

confuting the counter argument, Rawls cannot hold onto his assertion that
people's natural assets are not to deserve niorally. Nozick's argument
aims at the very point. However, if we examine this argument in Rawls'
position, premise 1 in the argument fails because the premise already
presupposed natural assets as deserving before arguing. In short, Nozick
omits to offer valid grounds about his premise. Therefore, as far as the
argument does not resolve the omitted part, the argun1ent is useless in
confuting Rawls' assertion.
Rawls asserts that since natural assets are arbitrary from a moral
point of view, they cannot be deserved. Then, argument E does not offer
counter evidence about Rawls' insistence.

Nozick's works for counter

evidence will be focused on a question why natural assets should be
deserved in a moral point of view. After all, this question is reduced to the
question of argument D.
Argument F:
1. If people have X, and their having X (whether or not they deserve
to have it) does not violate anyone else's (Lockean) 1ight or entitlement to
X, and Y flows from (ruises out of, and so on) X by a process that does not
itself violate anyone's (Lockean) rights or entitlements, then the person is
entitled to Y.
lOl Nozick, 224.
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2. People's having the natural assets they do does not violate
anyone else's (Lockean) entitlements or right.102
Argument F insists that people are entitled to what they make, the
products of their labor, and to what they get from others or exchange. For
instance, it is not true that a person earns Y only if he is earned (or
otherwise deserves) whatever he used (inchiding natural assets) in the
process of earning y_ 10 3 Therefore, we say that he may have some of the
things he uses, not illegitimately.

11

It need not be that the foundations

underlying desert are themselves deserved, all the way down. 11104
This description means that natural assets, after all, need not be
themselves deserved. While Rawls' argument is that natural assets are
not to deserve morally, Nozick1 s is that they need not be deserved morally.
ArgumentG:
1. People are entitled to their natural assets.
2. If people are entitled to something, they are entitled to whatever
flows from it (via specified types of processes).
3. People's holdings flow from their natural assets.
Therefore,
4. People are entitled to their holdings.
5. If people are entitled to something, then they ought to have it
(and this overrides any presumption of equality there may be about
holdings) _l05

102 Nozick,
l03 Nozick,
104 Nozick,
105 Nozick,

225.
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225.
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Argument G explains that whether or not people's natural assets
11

are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to
what flows from them. 106 This is in accord with Lockean theory of the
11

right of property as a natural right. Locke said that though the earth and
all that is therein belong to mankind in common, men can have ownership
of them. Namely,
Every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work
of his hands we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then,
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
7
property. 10
However, this Lockean thought has difficulties in sustaining its
persuasive power in the modern world that is overlapped by new problems
like population explosion, starvation, men's irrational mastery over
nature, and complex aspects caused by advent of industrial society. The
question is that how we can harmonize a right of property as a natural
right with Lockean proviso. Th.is may be possible in ancient society, but
impossible in modern cultured society. To avoid such problems, Rawls
offers his egalitarian justice
Rawls' Difference Principle and the Principle of Distribution in Marxism
The difference principle is a standard on how we will distribute
economical profits in social cooperation.

Although this principle is a

principle of distribution about interests gained by spontaneous
106 Nozick, 220.
l07 Locke, 15.
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cooperation, if we extensively interpret the principle, we can say that the
principle is offered for fa.ii· distribution in dividing important systems in a
state.
In addition, there is an analogy between the difference principle
and the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty.108 To understand the
maximin rule, suppose that there are three distributive situations 81, 82,
and 83, and three decisions D1, D2, and Da. The first decision D1 is that
81 has 2, 82 gets 8, and 8s has 10 profits. The sum of profits in D1 is 20.
D2 is that 81 acquires 1, 82 gets 7, and 83 obtains 14 pro.fits, and then the
total profits in D2 is 22. In the last case D s, 81 has 5, 82 acquires 6, and 83
gets 8. The sum of profits in D 3 is 19.
Given distributive situations 81, 82, and 83, according to the
maximin rule, we will choose D3 because the safest choice is to choose a
way allocating the most pro.fits among several worst cases. In short, in a
case choosing D.2, although we acquire 14 as the maximum value in Ss,
we also gain 1 as the worst case in 81. As a result, we will choose D3 that
guarantees the maximum value among the minimum.
The difference principle is system in distribution, that is, as there
are given distributive situations, the principle chooses a situation that
gives everyone pro.fits and, at the same time, maximizes the pro.fits of
those worst off Therefore, according to the difference principle, we will
choose Dain the above situations.
According to the principle of utility of utilitarianism, we will choose
D 2 because the principle of utility supports the maximum rule. Even

108 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 152.
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though utilitarian has a risk having 1 in 81 when we choose D2, they
would not give up the maximum value in 83. Also, since the principle of
utility pursues the maximum of sum of profits (or happiness), they cannot
help choosing D2, because D2 (81+S 2+83=22) brings more happiness than
D1 (81+82+83=20) or D3 (81+82+83= 19).
As we consider the two systems of distribution (the difference
principle and the principle of utility), it is possible for the principles to be
applied to only liberal or democratic society based on the capitalistic
relations of product. Accordingly, Rawls1 principle of distribution as the
difference principle is criticized by socialistic theorists.
Dahrendorf summarized Marx 1 s theory on the classes with three
cases.

First, the division of wealth in the sphere for distribution

corresponds to the division of property in production, and a person 1 s
material condition of existence, or class situation, is based on his position
in production.

Second, the distribution of property in production

determines the distribution of political power in society. The third is that
the distribution of property in production shapes the ideas that mold the
character of a period. Therefore, the ruling ideas of a period have always
been nothing but the ideas of the ruling class.109 From the above, we
suppose that the primary factor to obstruct the realization of equality is
classes.
Also, according to Hunt, Stalin denounced equalitarianism in the
name of Engels in his report to the 17th Congress of 1934 and said that
equalitarianism had nothing to do with MaTxism or Leninism, and that
109 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society
/Cabfornia: Stanford UP., 1959) 12-14.
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"by equality Marxism means not the equalization of individual
requirements and individual lives, but the abolition of classes. 11110
From this citation, we can read the idea of socialistic equality from
Marx and Engels to Stalin.

Their ideas of equality are nothing but

inequality of classes which means unequal circumstances of distribution
between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Accordingly, the only way to resolve
inequality between classes is to abolish classes. According to Engels,
"The elimination of all social and political inequality" is also
a very questionable phrase in place of "the abolition of all
class distinctions. 11 ••• there will always exist a certain
inequality in the conditions of life, which it will be possible to
reduce to a minimum but never entirely remove .... the realm
of equality is a one-sided French idea resting upon the old
"liberty, equality, fraternity" - an idea which was justified as
a stage of development in its own time and place but which ...
should now be overcome, for it only produces confusion in
people1 s heads.111
In short, if equality does not mean the abolition of classes, the equality
only becomes an ambiguous conception. By citing Lenin, Hunt said again
that "equality is an empty phrase unless by equality is meant the
abolition of classes. nl 12 Accordingly, that the proletariat demand for
equality means the abolition of classes themselves, not only the abolition
of class privilege.
In addition, Dupre describes the communist society as the follows;
The only property that Communism wants to abolish is
capitalist property. But for the great majority of people this
110 R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1962) 217.
111 Frede1ick Engels, 11 Letter to A Behel, March 18-28, 1975,° Karl Marx
and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1970) 35.
112 Hunt, 217.
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can only be a gain, for the capitalists have already swallowed
up nine-tenths of all property. By making all capital common
property, Communism converts accumulated labor from a
mere means for accumulating more labor into a direct boon to
the laborer himself_ 113
From the above citation, we extract two meanings concerning
distribution:

One is to return accumulated wealth of bourgeoisie to

society, and the other is to convert the accumulated labor to the laborer
himself. Through such processes, other systems of society will be replaced
by II an association in which the free development of each is the condition
for the free development of all. 114
11

Then, how is the principle of distribution accomplished in the
association? Marx's banner "from each according to his ability, to each
according to his need" 11 5 can be a general principle of distribution in
communism. Also, socialism as the preceding stage of communism seems
to be governed by a principle 'from each according to his ability, to each
according to his work'. Namely,
1. Socialism: work according to his ability, and distribute according
to his work.
2. Communism: work according to his ability, and distribute
according to his needs.
Case (1) is different from the system of distribution in capitalism
although their formation is very similar. Capitalism is based on a system
113 Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966) 201.
114 Dupre, 203.
115 Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program" The Marx-Engels
Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
1972) 388.
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of natural distribution through free competition, whereas socialism is a
distributive system of central government through the socialization of the
means of production. If we choose pure capitalism, it is difficult for us to
escape the excessive inequality of wealth, whereas if we choose socialism,
it is difficult for us to escape withering of liberty according to the control of
central government.

Rawls1 system of disttibution by the difference

principle seems to be based on the principle of distribution in capitalism
and, at the same time, seems to have self-control to overcome the
excessive inequality by improving system of distribution in the principle.
According to the principle of communism,
In a society where case the Socialist Principle of Justice*
regulates distribution, the requirement is that everyone use
such talents as have been developed in him (though this need
not entail any allocation of workers to jobs), and the payment
of worker is contingent not upon their contributions but upon
their needs.116
1

Rawls difference principle as the principle of distribution requires
that the basic structure of society be arranged in such a way that any
inequalities in gaining the primary goods of wealth, income, power, and
authority must work to the greatest benefit of those persons who are the
less advantaged. Judging the principle from socialists' position, Rawls 1
principle of distribution has some weak points. First of all, Rawls does not
sufficiently consider that social and economical inequalities are not simply
ones between individuals or strata, but ones between classes.

Rawls

* Nell and O'Neill regard the principle(2) as the socialist p1i.nciple of

justice. Edward Nell and Onora O'Neill, "Justice under Socialism"
Justice: Alternative Political Perspectives (California: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1980)
116 Nell and O'Neill, 201.
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largely ignores the conception of class and generally talks about classes in
ways most bourgeois social scientists do, where class and strata are
roughly interchangeable terms.
According to Nielsen, Rawls believes that "institutionalized
inequalities which affect the whole life prospects of human beings are
inescapable in complex societies" 11 7 Rawls' intention seems to me that
since inequalities in our society are inevitable, it is better for us to find
ways to minimize the inequalities. In addition, Nielsen says,
If, alternatively, we either think of classes, as a Marxist does,
essentially in terms of the relationship to the means of
production or as cohesive groups between which there are
considerable differences in income, prestige or authority and
because of these differences there are radically different life
prospects, it is not so evident that we can safely assume, as
Rawls does, that classes are inevitable_ 118
If we destroy the classes that hold most means of production, the
abolition of classes is possible bee ause classes are determined according to
whether they have the means of production or not.

Following Marx's

theory, under situation that bourgeois hold most means of production and
obtains the exclusive possession of powers deciding distribution of labor,
inequalities ought to be understood to ones of classes. Accordingly, the
realization of equal society is possible not by applying the difference
principle, but by establishing classless society.
Secondly, according to Rawls, inequalities are justified only in the
case that the less advantaged gain benefit. Although a capitalist invests
117 Kai Nielsen, "Class and Justice" in Justice and Economic Distribution
ed. by John Arthur, William H. Shaw (_New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1978) 228.
118 Nielsen, 228.
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his fund and gains some interests as the result of investment, if the result
of investment gives workers as the less advantaged some benefit, the
situation is just.

This is an exact theory of (revised) capitalism.

For

example, we suppose that to produce ten dolls, a capitalist invests 1,000
dollars and hires the unemployed. The 1,000 dollars is divided to 200
dollars for machine, 400 dollars for materials, 300 dollars for wages (50
dollars per hour), and 100 dollars for depreciation cost. The real price of a
doll is 100 dollars (100 x 10= 1,000).
If the employer sells the doll to customers for 100 dollars, the deal
does not give any meaning to the capitalist. Namely, the capitalist wants
interests (200 dollars). The price of a doll as goods will be 120 dollars.
Then, how can the employer gain 200 dollar as interests? Creating the
value of goods is human being's labor. To make the interests, the laborer
have to work more 4 hours (50 x 4=200). In fact, though the worker's true
value of labor is 50 dollars per hour, he gets 30 dollars as his wages a
hour. Namely, the 20 dollars is exploited from the worker, and the 20
dollars is the capitalist's interests.
Also, when the worker buys the doll for his baby, he must pay 120
dollars, not 100 dollars. Although he has exploited 20 dollars to make the
doll in wages a hour, he also has to pay 20 more dollars to buy the doll. In
short, he is exploited doubly. If the capitalist invests 200,000 dollars to
make dolls and employs more workers, his profits are greater, and the
employer may try to invest his profits in expanding his business or in
beginning other businesses.

Such processes go on other places. The

exploitation of labor must be deepened continuously.

Is such a society just? Those who support that type of society say
that when a capitalist begins his business he must think of the risk of the
business so that acquiring interests as shares of the risk is just. Response
to the view is not easy because we must think of other problems, that is,
how does he achieve more wealth?

And does he get his wealth

accidentally or from exploitation? Since Marxists, at least, believe that
his assets are the result of exploitation, the society is not just, and
acquiring his profits is unjust.

Accordingly, though Rawls 1 difference

principle supports welfare capitalism, the principle does not resolve the
question of justice in distribution.
After all, Rawls 1 difference principle never resolves inequalities in
distribution, but the justified inequality supports modern welfare
capitalism because the capitalism supports not only interests of
bourgeoisie but also the less advantaged through the social security
services. As returning some of interests of bourgeoisie to society, and as
using the money for the less advantaged, Rawls 1 difference principle is
justified in the welfare capitalism. However, we must know that the very
money is to be exploited from the shares of the less advantaged.
Accordingly, to remove inequalities in distribution, Marxists are to assert
the abolition of classes and the socialization of wealth.
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CHAPTERIV
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examined the process ori how the principle of justice
is derived from a hypothetical point, considered two principles of justice in
Rawls' theory of justice, and offered criticisms on the principle of justice in
the aspects of Rawls' themy itself, Nozick's entitlement theory, and
Marxism.

According to Rawls, the basic requirement of the system of

society is justice.

As contracting parties agree to general principles

governing their system, they will choose the principles of justice in a
hypothetical position like the parties in the classical contract theory
formed civil society through contract from the state of nature. Then, there
are some circumstances to be the principles of justice. The circumstances
of justice are that those who a.re mutually disinterested present the
conflicting requirements of social interests under the moderate scarcity of
resources. As those who are mutually disinterested would realize social
cooperation, the adjustment of conflicting interests is inevitable, and the
principles of adjustment will be the principles of social justice.
Also, to pass through fair procedure in contract, we need to nullify
some factors that tempt contracting parties so as to use their natural and
social circumstances advantageously. Thereupon, Rawls presupposes that
the parties must be covered by the veil of ignorance. The parties neither
know their sense of value and plan of life, nor their psychological
70
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inclination and particular circumstances of their society, but to derive the
principles of justice Rawls permits general knowledge and the knowledge
that their society is under circumstances of justice.
Rawls' distinction between general knowledge and individual one is
ve1y ambiguous. Not only is general knowledge like politics or economy
informed by backing of individual knowledge ·of political, economical, and
cultural situations which belong to them, but also the principle of system
of society is reconsidered and acquired in diverse social and historical
events. Accordingly, if the situation that individual knowledge is nullified
by the veil of i gnorance is the original position, we cannot get any actual
knowledge from the original position. Also, a hypothetical contract carries
no actual binding force.
Rawls presents two principles of justice, and my main concern is on
the difference principle that without improving conditions of all those who
are worst off, the advantages of all those better off should not be
permitted. It is, however, a hypothetical situation not an actual one. The
principle under the hypothetical situation loses its validity in the actual
one. Being one of the less advantaged in the actual one, I am willing to
accept the principle, whereas if I was one of those better off, I would
never accept the principle. In short, as someone acquires more social
wealth through his labor and his talent than others', he never agrees with
the difference principle. After all, to keep the difference principle, we
must sustain the hypothetical situation. If the principle is actualized in
our society, it infringes on personal rights. According to Nozick, we do
not have any rights to control his right of ownership, and if we take
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sanction against his right of ownership, this is to deprive him of his civil
liberties or his natural right.
Also, according to Marxism, since human inequalities are caused by
classes, we resolve the unequal situations only through the abolition of
classes.

Accordingly, the realization of just society is possible not by

applying the difference principle, but by establishing classless society.
After all, Rawls 1 difference principle never resolves inequalities in
distribution, but the justified inequalities support modern welfare
capitalism.
Rawls also thinks that since natural assets are arbitrary from a
moral point of view, the individual ownership of value produced by such
talents must be nullified. Since his natural assets are not the result of his
own activity but formed accidentally by social conditions, social control
must be permitted in the distribution of earning according to such
benefits.
Whether or not someone has natural assets is not the question of
moral arbitrariness because there cannot be moral reason behind the
difference of natw·al assets.

According to Nozick, if there is no moral

reason about the ownership of natural assets, social control on values
produced from it cannot be permitted. If someone is under social control
because of his outstanding talents, such a system of distribution is unjust.
It can be an infringement of fundamental rights in personal ownership.
From the summary of this paper, we know some characteristics of
1

Rawls theory of justice. First of all, he denies distributive system in pure
capitalism because the distribution in the system permits the unequal

distribution of wealth as well as the justification of natural assets
through free competition.

In fact, under free competition, the better

advantaged can acquire more social wealth than the less advantaged can.
Accordingly, inequalities coming from natural assets are refused.
Secondly, Rawls considers a system that minimizes the inequalities
of wealth with sustaining the merit of capitalism.

Although we recognize

the inequalities of wealth, the inequalities must be permitted only in
order to maximize the profits of the less advantaged. Rawls1 intention is
on discovering how we can minimize the inequalities of social wealth
under pure capitalism. This is his difference principle, which supports
modern welfare capitalism.
Finally, according to Marxism, the ownership of natural assets is
given neither by nature nor by accident.

The history of ownership of

natural assets began from exploitation. Since social inequality is caused
by the exploitation of the governing classes, dissolving of social inequality
is possible by the abolition of classes.

Rawls1 concerns in distributive

justice are not to fundamentally resolve the problem of inequalities in
society,

but to minimize social inequality with sustaining the present

system of society. Rawls 1 distributive justice is rather an alternative
proposal to resolve social inequality deepened in capitalism than a
fundamental solution about social inequality.
In spite of some problems, Rawls' theory of justice supports the
theory of the welfare capitalism well. In fact, Nozick1 s entitlement theory
fails in some points. His theory of right in holdings is very arbitrary. We
have right not to lose our holdings without our agreement, and right to
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own some objects as the result of our labor without violating Lockean
proviso. Obviously, there is some intuitive appeal in his theory. However,
we have rights prior to political or economical rights. If someone is in
adversity, he has right to receive others' consideration. The assertion also
has intuitive appeal. If we recognize such rights prior to political rights,
Nozick's entitlement theory loses its persuasive power.
Also, although we agree that we should not infringe on others'
rights, there are conflicts between rights. In such cases, which rights will
be chosen? According to Nozick, the property right is prior to other rights.
I doubt why we must firstly choose right in holdings, and why the right in
holdings is more important than others.
To resolve inequalities coming from free exchange activities,
prohibiting every free exchange activity is not good solution. From the
fact that prohibiting every free activity is bad, it does not naturally follow
that placing some restrictions on the free exchange to resolve inequalities
is also bad. Rawls' theory of justice is an alternative proposal to resolve
the problem of inequalities coming from free exchange activities.
Then, why can we not fundamentally resolve inequalities? Rawls'
theory is not fundamental solution about social inequality but an
alternative proposal to resolve social inequality deepened in capitalism.
Although we are interested in the least advantaged and make their
situations better, there are still inequalities. Rawls' difference principle
resolves absolute inequalities (poverty) to some extent, but there are
obviously relative inequalities (poverty) in our society, and the
inequalities hurt human self-respect.
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How can we resolve inequalities in our society? Marxism as an
answer to the question has a persuasive power in two aspects.

First,

Marxism is based on our history not a hyp othetical situation, and
Marxism, secondly, requires the fundamental solution of inequalities.
Since inequalities are formed by the exploitation of governing class,
the abolition of classes is only way to resolve the inequalities. The reason
why Rawls' theory does not resolve inequalities is because he does not deal
with the question of why inequalities occur in our history, and he excludes
the fundamental problem called the abolition of classes. Rawls' difference
principle justifies inequalities and tries to minimize the inequalities.
However, minimizing inequalities by permitting inequalities is
contradictory because the inequalities are due to the exploitation of ruling
class. After exploiting 10 dollars, returning 5 dollars to society is not just.
According to Marxism, our history is the process of the struggle of
classes and the process that the ruled classes retake their rights. If so,
we have a possibility to resolve inequalities. Since inequalities are due to
the exploitation of governing class in our history, when the ruling class is
removed by the struggle of classes, the inequalities can be resolved. In
short, inequalities are resolved by the abolition of classes.
After all, Marxism tries fundamentally to resolve inequalities by
the abolition of classes.

Is it possible to realize truly equal society?

Although Marxists' classless society is not practical in our age, the
classless society is theoretically possible.

Since classes are defined by

their social ownership, the abolition of private ownership means the
abolition of classes, and the classless society will be equal society. 'Th.e
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realization of equal society by the abolition of classes is a faith based on
our history.
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